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An increased demand in ubiquitous high speed wireless access has led integration of
different wireless technologies provided by different administrative domains creating
truly a heterogeneous network. Security is one of the major hurdles in such network
environment. As a mobile station moves in and out of the coverage area of one wireless
network to another, it needs to be authenticated. The existing protocols for authentication
of a mobile station are typically centralized, where the home network participates in
each authentication process. It requires home network to maintain roaming agreement
with all other visiting networks. Moreover, the round trip time to home network results
high latency. This paper is focused on developing authentication protocol for wireless
network irrespective of the technologies or the administrative domain. We propose a
secure protocol which adopts strong features of Kerberos based on tickets for rigorous
mutual authentication and session key establishment along with issuance of token so that
the mobile station can have access to not only the roaming partner of home network but
also to the roaming partner of previous visited networks. The performance evaluation and
comparative analysis of the proposed protocol is carried out with the already implemented
standard protocols and most remarkable research works till date to confirm the solidity of
the results presented.
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd
1. Introduction
Existing wireless network technologies ranges from Wide Area Networks (WAN) such as cellular technology like UMTS
and CDMA2000 to Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN) such as Bluetooth and Infrared [1]. However, each technology
has its own limitations in terms of coverage and bandwidth. With the increased demand in ubiquitous high speed wireless
access, the current trend is to integrate different but complementary wireless access technologies andmake inter-operation
among different administrative domains possible. As such, we have heterogeneous wireless network with almost a global
coverage. This has led to the Always Best Connected (ABC) concept. For a mobile user, it is desirable to have higher speed
with lower price supporting seamless connectivity allowing inter-operation of the different technologies and providers.
For example, we can consider integration of 3G network and WLAN. A mobile user with dual radio interface supporting
both technologies can enjoy high bandwidth in WLAN network and switch to cellular network in the absence of WLAN for
universal roaming.
Maintaining strong security becomes inevitable requirement while integrating different wireless networks. The first and
foremost step to maintain security is to verify both the Mobile Station (MS) and the network by performing authentication
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Fig. 1. Centralized scheme.
process prior to any service delivery in each administrative domain. The critical problem in performing authentication in
such a distributed heterogeneous network lies in the following two facts.
Firstly, the roaming agreement should exist between two administrative domains for an inter-domain authentication. For
N numbers of administrative domain, we need to establish N(N−1)2 roaming agreements. In a true heterogeneous network,
there exist several administrative domains of different sizes each providing access to different wireless technologies.
The total number of inter-domain roaming agreements to be established in such a case would grow tremendously with
increase in number of administrative domains. Therefore, it is almost infeasible to maintain roaming agreement with all
the administrative domains in a practical scenario. To avoid such a situation, we need to establish spontaneous roaming
agreement between pair of domains.
Secondly, the authentication delay should be as minimal as possible to provide the experience of seamless transition. It
can be normally subjected to computation delay and propagation delay. We do not refer scanning delay here. To minimize
the authentication delayweneed to focus on simple computations and limit themessage flowbetweennodes. The round trip
time (RTT) between the home network (HN) and visiting network (VN) presents an overwhelming impact on propagation
delay. Hence, the communication between HN and VN should be avoided, if possible. Most of the existing protocols are
based on centralized scheme. Each time an MS hand-offs to another VN, HN is required to participate in authentication as
shown in Fig. 1.
This paper describes a novel authentication protocol based on Kerberos suitable for heterogeneous network. Kerberos
is a network authentication protocol designed to provide strong authentication for client/server applications by deploying
Kerberos Server as Trusted Third Party (TTP). It was developed at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology as part of Project
Athena in the mid-1980s and uses strong cryptography so that a client can prove its identity to a server (and vice versa)
across an insecure network connection [2]. Since Kerberos is a lightweight protocol based on inexpensive symmetric key
cryptography, it is more adaptable for small devices with low computational power.
We exploit the Kerberos protocol for mutual authentication between the MS and the VN that shares roaming agreement
with theMS’ HN. HN acts as a TTP based on the trust relation it shareswith VN and theMS. It grants a ticket toMS andmutual
authentication is performed between MS and VN. After successful authentication, MS receives a token from the visited
network with which it can roam to another foreign network that shares roaming agreement with previous visited network,
but notwith its homenetwork. As such, HN is not required in the successive authentication process. As the proposed protocol
adapts Kerberos protocol and offers inter-domain authentication, we refer it herein as Kerberos based Authentication for
Inter-domain Roaming (KAIR). Unlike centralized scheme, KAIR is a distributed scheme as shown in Fig. 2.
The main contributions of our work are:
(i) to extend the mobility range of MS beyond the roaming partners of HN by using previous visited domain as TTP, and
(ii) to reduce the authentication latency by avoiding RTT to HN in succeeding authentication process once it is successfully
authenticated in the presence of HN.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related works followed by Section 3 in which
we discuss the proposed protocol in detail. The security analysis is carried out in Section 4. In Section 5, we carry out
comparative analysiswith other different protocols. In Section 6, the performance evaluation ismeasured in terms of average
authentication delay. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 7.
2. Related work
The authentication protocols developed for wireless network are technology specific or meant for a set of technologies
(like integrated cellular network and 802.11). Due to emerging heterogeneous network, technology independent protocols
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Fig. 2. Distributed scheme.
are required to be addressed. In this section, we look at some of the already implemented standard protocols for technology
specific wireless networks and the recently designed protocols for heterogeneous network.
2.1. Implemented standards
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) that runs directly over data link layer, originally developed to use with PPP,
has also been applied subsequently to IEEE 802 wired networks, wireless networks such as IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.16e,
and IKEv2. EAP is used as an encapsulation protocol for upper layer authentication information and allows for various
authentication mechanisms so called, EAP methods. Out of more than 40 EAP methods, Transport Layer Security (TLS) [3] is
considered to be promising as it has undergone an extensive review and is considered to be cryptographically strong. It is
based onPublic Key Interface (PKI) anduses client and server-side certificates for authentication in 802.11. TheWi-Fi Alliance
has added EAP–TLS to Wi-Fi certified products. Therefore, the implementation of EAP–TLS is pervasive in WLAN world. To
exploit the popularity and strong features of TLS, the variants of TLS protocol such as USIM based EAP–TLS [4], advanced
SSL/TLS based authentication [5] andmany other protocols have been proposed to support interworking of differentwireless
technologies. Since all of these protocols authenticate bymeans of digital certificates, it automatically inherits all certificate-
related problems. For small devices, storing long digital certificates require higher memory. Similarly, the certificate should
be issued by sameCertificate Authority (CA) ormaintain a chain to the trusted root CA.Moreover, it lacks potential scalability
in distributed heterogeneous environment and appears to be expensive particularly for micro-transactions.
EAP-AKA is another EAP-method popular for interworking 3G-WLAN developed in the 3GPP by Ericsson and Nokia [6].
It provides an opportunity to any application or protocol which can perform EAP authentication to perform UMTS
authentication (i.e. UMTS AKA)mechanism aswell. It is based upon symmetric keys and runs typically on a UMTS Subscriber
Identity Module (USIM). It comprises of two phases: (i) distribution of authentication vectors from the HN to VN and
(ii) authentication and key agreement procedure between the MS and the Serving Network. AKA lacks rigorous mutual
authentication. As such, it is vulnerable to re-directive attack as cited in [7].
2.2. Proactive solutions
The proactive methods are normally used for intra-domain authentication. However, recently this approach is suggested
for inter-domain authentication also. In proactive methods, the MS is authenticated to neighbouring networks before
handover takes place.
In [8], a shadow registration method is proposed. The concept is to establish the security association between MS and
the Authentication Server (AS) in neighbouring networks so that after hand off, the registration process is processed locally
within that particular domain without contacting home network. As this method operates like the shadow as one walks, it
is referred as shadow registration. However, for the pre-establishment of security association, HN needs to be contacted by
local network to inform about neighbouring network.
A Media-independent Pre-Authentication (MPA) is proposed in [9]. It is an MS assisted pre-configuration and pre-
authentication method that is executed to a target network before the actual handoff. It is used to enhance the performance
of existing mobility protocols by proactively performing layer 3 and layer 4 associations and bindings before the actual
handoff takes place, thereby saving time for these operations that usually only take place after the layer 2 association. It
comprises of four procedures. The first procedure is referred to as pre-authentication, the second procedure is referred
to as pre-configuration, the combination of the third and fourth procedures are referred to as secure proactive handover.
It requires long time to discover and select multiple candidate networks to connect, and initiate pre-authentication and
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Fig. 3. Assumed roaming scenario.
pre-configuration procedures with the candidate network. Therefore, it is suitable only where an accurate prediction of
movement can be made easily.
2.3. Ticket/token based solutions
The ticket/token based solution appears to be most feasible solution as it can exploit the distributed nature of roaming
agreements in heterogeneous network and establish dynamic roaming agreement with other foreign networks that do not
share roaming agreement with the home network.
A proof token based authentication protocol is proposed in [10] which exploit the features of EAP–TLS. The MS carries
a certificate issued by its home domain’s CA and proof-tokens which are similar to certificates but are issued by previous
visited domain’s CA after successful authentications in that particular domain. It supports establishment of spontaneous
roaming agreement between pair of domains that do not already have a direct roaming agreement. It differs from EAP–TLS
in the sense that instead of the MS presenting a fixed X.509 certificate issued by a root CA, it presents a proof token issued
by a foreign domain it has recently visited and with which the current domain also has roaming relations. Another differing
point is that the AS carries a number of roaming certificates instead of a single certificate issued by root CA. To find out
which token to use, the MS sends a list of all visited domain names. The AAA server chooses a common domain between
MS’ visited domain list and its roaming partner domain list, and sends the corresponding roaming certificate. The rest of the
message exchange is same as EAP–TLS. Although this mechanism seems promising, yet analysis needs to be carried out in
terms of latency and efficiency since it involves asymmetric encryptions as in TLS.
In [11], a Fast re-Authentication Protocol (FAP) is proposed for inter-domain roaming which eliminates the need of
communication between the target and home network for credentials verification and uses short living lightweight re-
authentication ticket. It consists of two sub-protocols; ticket acquisition and fast re-authentication. The former is executed
when the user is attached to the network and it requires inter-domain communication, and the latter is executed during
handover and localizes the authentication process in the target domain. However, to generate authentication tickets, the AS
should have access to results of different authentication methods, which may have been used for the last authentication.
Moreover, the MS needs to update the information about future possible roaming partners frequently as the lifetime is very
short.
3. Proposed protocol
3.1. Assumptions
The few assumptions considered in our protocol are illustrated in Fig. 3. The MS and its home network share a secret key
Km of 128 bits. This secret key is provided by HN at the time of subscription to MS. The MS can roam from one non-home
network to another. To distinguish these visited networks, we will presume the one which MS visits at first and shares
roaming agreement with the HN as the first visiting network (VN1). VN1 and HN share a secret key Kv of 128 bits. The secret
key is established during the roaming agreement between the two networks. After successful authentication in VN1, MS
enters another visiting network close to VN1 geographically. We call this network the second visiting network (VN2). VN2
shares roaming agreement with VN1 but not with HN. VN1 and VN2 also share a secret key Kr established during the roaming
agreement between VN1 and VN2 which is also 128 bits. The roaming agreement should establish strong trust relationship
between the domains.
3.2. Initial authentication
During the initial authentication in VN1, HN acts as TTP as shown in Fig. 4. It issues the ticket just like Kerberos server
and assists in establishing session key betweenMS and VN1. VN1 grants a token to MS after the successful authentication for
further authentication in other domains. The authentication comprises of seven steps as follows:
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Fig. 4. Initial authentication in VN1 .
Step1: The presence of MS is perceived during scanning phase by the VN1 within its coverage area and therefor a request
is sent for identification of the MS.
Step 2: The MS responds with its identity which is in NAI (Network Access Identifier) format of 72 bytes [12] indicating
its home network to which it is subscribed for routing.
Step 3: Upon receiving the address of the home network of MS, VN1 sends the authentication request to the HN including
the identity of MS.
Step 4: The HN confirms the identity of MS and if valid, responds back to MS with message (see (1)) comprising four
parameters—a session key (SK1), the identity of the visiting network (VN1ID), a ticket (TKT), and its lifetime. The entire
parameters are encrypted with secret key Km. The ticket consists of session key between MS and VN1, its Lifetime, MS’
network interface address (niAddr), and identity of MS all encrypted by the secret key (Kv) shared between VN1 and HN.
niAddr could be IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) for cellular phones or MAC address assigned to network
interface cards for computers and so on depending on the devices.
EKm{SK1 ‖ VN1ID ‖ TKT ‖ Lifetime} (1)
TKT = EKv{ID ‖ SK1 ‖ niAddr ‖ Lifetime}. (2)
Step 5: As the fourthmessage is encrypted by the secret key Km that is possessed by only MS and HN, VN1 cannot decrypt
it and simply relays the same message to the MS.
Step 6: The MS decrypts and retrieves the ticket TKT along with session key SK1, VN1ID and Lifetime. The MS checks the
VN1ID to confirm if the HN received the authentication request from the same VN as theMS has requested. TheMS generates
authenticator (Auth) as
Auth = ESK1{ID ‖ niAddr ‖ nonce}. (3)
It then sends TKT and Auth to VN1.
Step 7: The VN1 decrypts the TKT with secret key Kv and retrieves the session key SK1. It also decrypts Auth using SK1
and recovers identity of MS and nonce. The Auth ensures that the ticket is being presented by the same client to whom
250 A.P. Shrestha et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 245–255
Fig. 5. Re-authentication in VN2 .
it was issued. The recovered nonce is increased by unit value which is then encrypted by the same session key. VN1 also
generates a token to verify MS has been successfully authenticated. The incremented nonce and token are sent back to
the MS.
The MS decrypts the message sent by the VN1 and after confirmation of nonce; the establishment of proper session key
between them is realized.
3.3. Token format
The token issued by the first visiting network consists of:
(1) Issued network: represents the name of the network which has provided the token (i.e.VN1).
(2) Destined network: represents the name of the roaming partner network (i.e. VN2) of the token issuing network.
(3) Lifetime: determines the end of the token validity period. The lifetime could be set from few hours to days as per our
requirement.
(4) Proof Credential: consists of anonymous identity (user pseudonym) provided by the token issuing network (VN1) to the
MS after successful authentication in its domain. The user pseudonym is encrypted by secret key Kr shared by issuing
network and destined network.
Proof Credential = EKr{user pseudonym}. (4)
3.4. Re-authentication
When the MS enters VN2, the roaming partner of VN1 that shares no trust relations with the HN, VN1 acts as TTP. The MS
presents the token received from VN1 to authenticate itself in VN2. The authentication takes place as shown in Fig. 5.
Step 1: The identity of MS is requested by VN2.
Step 2: MS passes on the token provided to it by the VN1 from previous authentication process.
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Step 3: The VN2 validates the token and decrypts the proof credentials by using secret key Kr . It then sends authentication
request by passing on user pseudonym to the VN1 which it had assigned to the MS.
Step 4: The VN1 verifies the user pseudonym and if valid, generates the ticket which consists of new session key (SK2)
betweenMS and VN2 encrypted by secret key Kr . VN1 also derives another key KMV whichwe refer as extended roaming key.
It is also of 128 bits long. This key is derived by pseudorandom function (PRF) from parameters including previous session
key (SK1); nonce and the MS’ network interface address (niAddr).
KMV = PRF [SK1 ‖ nonce ‖ niAddr]. (5)
TheMS can derive the extended roaming key before authentication start to reduce authentication latency. VN2 sends back
ticket, session key, and Lifetime along with the identity of new visiting network (VN2) encrypted by the extended roaming
key KMV . The rest of the steps (5, 6, and 7) continue as described in Section 3.2, except this timeAuth comprises of parameters
as shown in (6)
Auth = ESK2{proof credential ‖ niAddr ‖ nonce}. (6)
4. Security analysis
4.1. Mutual authentication
Since we deploy TTP during authentication, both the MS and visiting network are certain that they are communicating
with their authentic counterparts. Based on the trust shared with TTP, the authenticating entities confirm that both of them
share the same session key. The visiting network retrieves session key from TKT sent by MS. The TKT is encrypted by the
secret shared key between VN and TTP which assures that the MS cannot modify it. This confirms that the MS is authentic.
Similarly, the MS authenticates visiting network using nonce. The nonce is sent embedded within the authenticator. The
verification of the incremented nonce which is encrypted with the same session key ensures the VN also possesses the
correct session key.
4.2. Key derivation and delivery
The key establishment among the authenticating entities can be divided into the key derivation and key delivery schemes.
KAIR protocol involves one key derivation scheme and one key delivery scheme. The session key is always generated
by TTP and it is delivered to authenticating parties using secure encryption method based on key delivery scheme. This
avoids the computational overhead to client and also reduces the resources required to derive the key. On the other hand,
the extended roaming key KMV is based on key derivation scheme. KMV is derived mutually by TTP and the client using
common one-way pseudorandom functions based on the parameters like earlier session key between them, nonce and
niAddr. We use the key derivation scheme because it provides the opportunity for client to contribute in generating the
secret key while it is in alien network that is not trusted by HN. The key itself is not required to be transmitted in the alien
network.
4.3. Identity protection
The original identity of the client is hidden in the new VN that does not share any roaming agreement with the HN of MS.
To achieve this, user pseudonym is deployed which has no logical relationship with the original identity of the client. The
client pseudonym is assigned by the first visited network that shares roaming agreement with HN, while issuing the token.
The first visited network however, needs to keep the record of client pseudonym in its database.
4.4. Man in the middle attack
An unwanted party could impersonate in the visiting network. The threat from such an attack is avoided by assuring the
identity of visited network provided by TTP in step 4 and 5. TTP sends the identity of visiting network encrypted by secret
key shared betweenMS and TTP. Thus,MS can always compare the received identity of the VNwith the onewhich it receives
from beacon signal at scanning phase before it enters to the visiting network. If the two identities do not match each other,
the client can be aware of illegitimate entities in the VN. Moreover, the MS can also validate the incremented nonce send by
the VN. If somehow it differs from the one sent by the MS or does not receive any nonce at all, it can be aware of false party
acting as an entity of visiting network.
4.5. Compromised tickets and tokens
If somehow a ticket or token is compromised, it is still difficult to counterfeit. In order to exploit the use of compromised
ticket, one should present authenticator as well. To generate authenticator, niAddr and identity of MS are required which
are specific as per the device and the user of device. Similarly, for exploiting stolen token one should have knowledge of
previous session key to derive secret key KMV . Without deriving the secret key KMV one cannot decrypt the further message.
Besides that, the token has its own lifetime for validity which limits the damage.
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Table 1
Comparison.
Protocol
[Reference]
Hand off Encryption
key
Computational
load
Mutual
authentication
Inter technology
roaming
Round trip to HN in
successive
authentication
Inter-domain trust
required
TLS [3] Reactive Public
key
Relatively
High
Yes No Yes Certificate based
AKA [6] Reactive Secret
key
Low Yes Cellular/ WLAN Yes Full
FAP [11] Reactive Any Variable Yes Yes No Partial
Proof token [10] Reactive Public
key
High Yes Yes No Partial
MPA [9] Proactive Not
defined
Not defined Yes Yes Yes Not required
Shadow
registration [8]
Proactive Not
defined
Not defined No Yes Yes Full
KAIR Reactive Secret
key
Relatively
low
Yes Yes No Partial
4.6. Brute-force attack
In order to prevent brute-force attack, no authentication ticket should have a lifetime longer than the expected time
required to crack the encryption of the ticket. However, we use 128 bits key Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which
would require years and years to crack even with the latest computing devices, unlike Data Encryption Standard (DES) in
actual Kerberos. Hence, the KAIR is safe frombrute-force attack.We need to set the lifetime ticket only to avoid replay attack.
5. Comparative analysis
In this section, we analyse the proposed protocol with other protocols discussed in Section 2. We compare these
protocols based on seven features as shown in Table 1. Besides MPA and Shadow registration, all the protocols are reactive
i.e. authentication takes place after handoff. Although implementing proactive method in inter-domain method is simple,
but for inter-domain authentication it requires accurate predictive mechanism which could be difficult to design. A pre-
authentication in inter-domain requires sufficient time, so prediction should bemade properly about next visiting network.
Encryption key is another important parameter as it affects the computational load. The use of complex asymmetric key
cryptography in TLS and Proof token methods results high computational load. AKA utilizes pre-shared key in USIM while
the shadow registration andMPAdonot specifywhether to use public key or pre-shared secret key. The key choice is optional
in FAP due to which the computational load is variable. KAIR involves symmetric encryption key and involves simple but
secure encryption technique like AES.
All the protocols supportmutual authentication except the shadow registration. However, althoughAKAprovidesmutual
authentication, it is still vulnerable to false base station attack. Similarly, the EAP–TLS is designed to support only WLAN
technology where as the AKA supports integratedWLAN and cellular network. The rest of the protocols are designed purely
for heterogeneous network. During the successive authentication in other visiting networks, TLS, AKA, MPA, and shadow
registration require to contact HN resulting higher latency. KAIR, Proof- Token, and FAP use token received from previous
successful authentication in successive authentication.
To implement any kind of protocol, we need to have some kind of inter-domain trust. The MPA requires only the MS to
have trust relation with the network to which it is trying to connect instead of the current network. In the case of FAP, Proof
token and KAIR, the networks are required to have a trust relationship with neighbouring adjacent networks. Whereas in
the case of AKA and shadow registration, HN should have direct trust relationship with the visiting networks. TLS is based
on digital certificates. So, these certificates should be issued by same CA or should have chain to a trusted root CA. Overall,
KAIR is satisfactory in terms of all the features enlisted in Table 1.
6. Performance evaluation
The authentication process introduces overhead in communication and influences QoS metrics. Hence, it is necessary
to maintain the authentication latency to minimum. We compare the authentication latency of KAIR protocol with already
implemented standard protocols like the EAP–TLS and AKA. Since, the rest of the protocols are still under research and exact
specifications are unavailable to implement under our test bed, we limit them to comparative analysis only.
6.1. Simulation methodology and testbed
Based on the specifications of each protocol, we compute the number of messages sent and received by the MS, home
network, and visiting network along with the length of each message in bytes. The computational speeds of cryptographic
A.P. Shrestha et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 245–255 253
Fig. 6. Simulation setup.
Fig. 7. Network configuration in visiting_network_1.
algorithms for encryption and decryption are obtained using a tool called Crypto++ [13]. The test is carried out running on
the Intel Core 2.2.1 GHz processor under Windows XP SP1.
We implement the protocols in OPNET [14] simulator. Four scenarios are designed each one for the implementation of
TLS, AKA and KAIR (initial and re-authentication) protocols. The roaming scenario for TLS is set up similar as explained
in [15,16]. We set up three networks namely home_network, visiting_network_1 and visiting_network_2 as shown in
Fig. 6. 802.11b environment is set up in visiting_network_1 where as UMTS network is set up in visiting_network_2 as
depicted in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively. The home_network is set up geographically far from visiting_network_1 where as
the roaming partner of visiting_network_1 i.e. visiting_network_2 is set up close to it. KAIR initial authentication occurs in
visiting_network_1 and re-authentication in visiting_network_2. For KAIR, we chose the AES for encryption and decryption.
In KAIR, the length of session key, ticket and token is 16 bytes, 102 bytes and 222 bytes respectively. The lifetime and nonce
length are 6 bytes and 8 bytes respectively.
In the first experiment, we set the RTT between HN and VN around 200 ms. The RTT between visiting_network_1 and
visiting_network_2 is set around 20ms. We varied the number of MS in the VN from 1 to 35 with interval of 5. As such, each
scenario is simulated 8 times. The authentication delay for each MS is recorded for all 8 simulations of each scenario. Then
the average authentication is calculated. Likewise, in the second experiment, we set 20 mobile stations in the network and
the RTT is varied from 100 to 500 ms with an interval of 50 ms. As in the first experiment, we run multiple simulations for
each scenario and average authentication delay is recorded.
6.2. Results
Experimental results show the authentication delay of standard authentication protocols and the proposed protocol.
Fig. 9 illustrates the average authentication latency for different number of MS. It can be seen that the latency provided by
KAIR is least. During experiment, we found that the round trip time between visiting network and home network has an
overwhelming impact on the authentication delay compared to that of the latency caused by the necessary cryptographic
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Fig. 8. Network configuration in visiting_network_2.
Fig. 9. Average authentication latency vs. no. of MS.
computations. Since, TLS involved multiple round trips to home network, complex cryptography, and sharing of certificates
with the mandatory chain to a trusted common root CA, it presented the highest delay. In the case of AKA, the transmission
of multiple sets of authentication vectors from home network to visiting network led relatively extra delay compared
to the proposed protocol. As the RTT between HN and VN was very critical in determining the latency, we check the
average authentication latency in terms of RTT in Fig. 10. Latency drastically increased in TLS with increasing RTT while
it gradually increased in the case of AKA and KAIR. On analysing the results of two experiments, it can be seen that the
average authentication delay for KAIR is least.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a TTP based authentication protocol as in Kerberos suitable for inter-domain roaming in
distributed heterogeneous network. The use of token helps to improve the mobility range in wide heterogeneous network
in a secure manner. The ticket issuing authority is achieved by a visiting network once the client and the visiting network
mutually authenticate themselves in the presence of home network’s participation. The ticket issuance authority can be
moved fromone network to another constituting a chain formation. Themain advantage of such an approach is performance
because the authentication requires message deliveries no farther than the adjacent networks. If an MS has tokens of a few
domains that it has visited recently, it can use the token provided by such domains to authenticate in most of the other
domains it wants to visit. The simulation results and analysis demonstrate that our protocol is secure and offers lower
latency.
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Fig. 10. Average authentication latency vs. RTT.
The proposed solution does not include the authorization and accounting issues while roaming in foreign networks that
do not share any roaming agreement with home network of MS. In the future work, we will further investigate policy based
authorizing and billing to overcome such problems. Managing such a policy completely lies in the hand of home network
and informs about the policy to its roaming partner. As such, the previous visited network can grant token to the MS based
on such policies only.
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